XLootStaking's reward share used the live `totalSupply()` at claim time, so the attacker minted and burned staking tokens around the claim. DeFiHackLabs reconstructs the drain.
Logged as “2026-04-15: Duplicate Xloot Redemption on XLootStaking”.
XLootStaking's reward distribution credited the user against the live totalSupply() of staking tokens at claim time. The attacker minted staking tokens to inflate totalSupply(), claimed a reward share at the inflated weight, then burned the staking tokens.
DeFiHackLabs reconstructs the sequence against the live state; total loss is captured in the PoC.
What would have prevented it: a reward share pinned to the user's recorded balance at stake time, not the live totalSupply().
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Updated 14 Oct 2026. Figures are as reported by the sources listed above and are not independently verified.