Crypto exploits

AaveRebalancerCreditDelegation exploit analysis

A sAVAX rebalancer on Aave V3 Avalanche let any caller route an arbitrary low-level call through its own address, so an attacker used a victim's unlimited Aave credit delegation to borrow 7,000 WAVAX onto the victim's debt and pull the proceeds out. DeFiHackLabs reports a loss of 6,999.91 WAVAX.

David

Security ·

Reported loss
6,999.91 WAVAX, per DeFiHackLabs
Occurred
Logged
Chain
Avalanche

Logged as “2026-04-19: Arbitrary External Call Credit Delegation Abuse on AaveRebalancerCreditDelegation”.

Analysis3 min read

AaveRebalancerCreditDelegation was a helper contract built on top of Aave V3's Avalanche market, meant to automate leveraged sAVAX positions. A user deposited sAVAX, granted the contract an Aave credit delegation through approveDelegation, and the contract would borrow WAVAX against that delegation to keep the position rebalanced. Aave's delegation model lets a user authorize a second address to draw variable-rate debt in the user's name without that address ever touching the user's collateral, on the assumption that the delegate only ever borrows for the purpose the user signed up for.

The rebalancer, at 0x7A7bAB45363Efb0394Ff27bfA29bb7C0534cA8C9 on Avalanche, exposed a public entry point at selector 0xb2a13230, decoding to (uint256 amount, address target, bytes data, bool flag), that let any caller direct the contract to execute an arbitrary low-level call from its own address. DeFiHackLabs's proof of concept describes the rebalancer as executing "caller-supplied target/data from its own address", and the deployed bytecode on Avalanche confirms the selector is live. The contract's source is not verified on Snowscan, so the function's name and whatever restriction it was supposed to carry are not public. What is verifiable on chain is only that the call succeeds for a caller with no relationship to the contract's owner.

One victim, 0x6fDAE9edACc6461b21f71a1a6a420197D2b0C3aa, had granted the rebalancer an unlimited WAVAX borrow allowance: Aave's variable debt token for WAVAX on Avalanche records a borrowAllowance from the victim to the rebalancer of type(uint256).max. The attacker never touched that allowance directly.

  1. The attacker's own contract opened a trivial Aave position, supplying a nominal amount of USDC and delegating its own WAVAX borrow allowance back to the rebalancer, satisfying whatever local bookkeeping the rebalancer's normal flow expected before it would act.
  2. The attacker called the rebalancer's arbitrary-call entry point with a target of Aave's pool and data encoding borrow(WAVAX, 7000 ether, 2, 0, victim). Because the call originated from the rebalancer's own address, Aave checked the rebalancer's delegation from the victim, found it unlimited, and minted 7,000 WAVAX of variable debt to the victim while sending the borrowed WAVAX to the rebalancer.
  3. A second call to the same entry point, targeting the WAVAX token contract directly, had the rebalancer transfer the WAVAX it now held out to the attacker's contract.
  4. The attacker repaid only the small debt opened in step one, leaving the victim's new 7,000 WAVAX debt in place, and moved the proceeds to the attacker address 0xf59dc5521f191Bcb53a9bcBD1654Be81B72EE96F.

The attack transaction, 0xaaa1b2e561738399af890dde2b18252b698e9b0ae7c8430fdd855f426835001b on Snowscan, ran on April 19, 2026 at 07:23:46 UTC through attack contract 0xe44EEa4C6C2085D590A4a6BeA01CF83E87A37bE5. Snowscan's record of the transfer to the attacker (6,999.911443798736841214 WAVAX) is valued there at about $65,729.30 as of the day of the transfer, alongside DeFiHackLabs's figure of 6,999.91 WAVAX; the two are the same tokens valued by different sources rather than disputed amounts.

No independent write-up of this incident turned up when searching for the attacker address, the rebalancer address, the victim address, or the DefimonAlerts account that first flagged it on X. That account's post is not fetchable directly. The rebalancer does not appear to be a product with any public footprint: there is no project website, audit, governance forum or news coverage under the AaveRebalancerCreditDelegation name, and no statement from an identifiable team about a pause, a patch, or compensation for the victim's new debt. That absence is a fact worth recording rather than a gap to guess around.

The mechanism is a narrow but complete version of a familiar credit-delegation failure: a contract that holds unlimited delegated borrowing power from its users must restrict every entry point that can direct that power to the user it is borrowing for, or to the specific rebalancing logic the user agreed to. An arbitrary-call surface sitting on top of real Aave credit lines removes that restriction entirely, so anyone who can reach the contract can borrow against any delegator's line and route the proceeds to an address of their choosing. Nothing in the site's other exploit analyses shares this particular shape. The AlpsCon and SetProtocol incidents also sit near Aave, but AlpsCon exploits flash-loan-funded reward accounting across contract versions and SetProtocol exploits permissionless fee-rounding on issuance and redemption; neither touches a delegated borrow being relayed through an arbitrary call, so no genuine comparison is drawn here.

What would have prevented it is a restriction inside the rebalancer's call-forwarding function limiting the caller, or the target and selector it is allowed to direct, to the contract's own documented rebalance path, so a credit delegation granted for one purpose cannot be redirected to an arbitrary Aave call chosen by an unrelated third party.

Sources read (4)