SquidMulticall's run() function let any caller execute arbitrary calldata against tokens approved to the contract, letting an attacker drain one victim's Binance-Peg ETH allowance for 1 ETH on BNB Chain. DeFiLlama attributes a combined $517,000 loss to the same bug across five chains.
Security ·
Logged as “2026-04-07: Arbitrary Call Wrong Approval on SquidMulticallAllowanceDrain”.
SquidMulticall, deployed on BNB Smart Chain at 0xad6cea45f98444a922a2b4fe96b8c90f0862d2f4, is one of Squid's own router helper contracts, not a third party building on the Squid name. Sourcify's verified match for the address identifies the file as contracts/router/SquidMulticall.sol, compiled with solc 0.8.23, and shows it was deployed by 0xb5e6c16cb726bb24075075e0993971aa8d73f764 at block 42,723,028, long before the attack. Its run(Call[] calldata calls) function loops over a caller-supplied array and, for each entry, executes call.target.call{value: call.value}(call.callData). Nothing in the loop checks that the call is being made on behalf of the account that approved SquidMulticall in the first place. Anyone can hand run() a call whose target is an ERC-20 token and whose callData encodes transferFrom, and the token sees the call arrive from SquidMulticall's own address, the address every user who wants to batch calls through it has to approve.
That is what the published proof of concept reconstructs: a single Default-type call targeting the Binance-Peg ETH token at 0x2170ed0880ac9a755fd29b2688956bd959f933f8, with callData of transferFrom(victim, attacker, 1 ether). SquidMulticall ran it and spent the victim's standing approval for the attacker's benefit.
The transaction DeFiHackLabs cites, 0x81d0c429ee7eae19d8c4d9d797dbd3828279060096e703b11cca739c9b1301e9, matches the transaction's on-chain record: block 91,122,250 on BNB Smart Chain, timestamp 2026-04-07 09:41:40 UTC, sent from 0xe02b595ca69d8d3e120043536e6e76caea385a82. It has no destination address. The attacker's own attack contract was created by this same transaction, and the exploit ran inside that contract's constructor rather than in a separate call afterward. The deployment bytecode carries the encoded call data for the drain, and it decodes to transferFrom(0xacc0c1f672b03b9a5fed4535f840f09b85f40e98, 0xe02b595ca69d8d3e120043536e6e76caea385a82, 1000000000000000000): the same victim, the same attacker and the same 1 ETH the PoC reproduces. The PoC's fork block, 91,122,249, sits one block before it.
DeFiLlama's hacks database lists this incident under the name SquidMulticall, classified as an improper access control failure, dated 2026-04-07. It reports a combined loss of $517,000 across every chain where the same contract address is deployed: Arbitrum, BNB Chain, Avalanche, Optimism and Base. That figure comes from a source independent of both the README and the PoC, and it is the one loss number here that carries that weight. The BNB Chain transaction this page documents, a single victim losing 1 ETH, is one piece of that total rather than the whole of it. The PoC's own comments separately cite a Twitter report of roughly $800,000 of approvals at risk across users and roughly $512,000 of it rescued by the alert account DefimonAlerts before an attacker could take it. No independent write-up or on-chain record of that rescue exists, so the $800,000 and $512,000 figures are carried here as an attributed but unverified claim, not as established fact. DeFiLlama's $517,000 and the PoC's Twitter-sourced numbers are close in size but are not the same measurement, and neither source reconciles them.
The fix sits in SquidMulticall rather than in the token. The ETH token's transferFrom behaved exactly as written, moving tokens from an approved spender to wherever that spender directs them. The missing check is upstream: run() never ties the calls it executes to the identity of the account that funded the approval being spent, so an approval made out to SquidMulticall functions as a shared pool any caller can draw from rather than an allowance scoped to its owner.
A later, unrelated incident, logged by DeFiHackLabs on 25 May 2026 (DeFiLlama dates it 4 May 2026), also traded on the Squid name. SquidRouterModule, a third-party Gnosis Safe module with no connection to SquidMulticall or to Squid's own router, drained $3.2 million from 86 Safe wallets through a missing caller check, a different contract, a different chain pairing (Ethereum and Base rather than BNB Chain), and a different bug entirely. The two incidents share only the brand they were reported under, about seven weeks apart by DeFiHackLabs' dating (7 April and 25 May).
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Updated 9 Nov 2026. Figures are as reported by the sources listed above and are not independently verified.