MONA LisaVault's `redeem` debited `msg.sender`'s share regardless of the supplied `recipient`. The attacker called `redeem(victim)` and walked the victim's shares out.
Logged as “2026-04-14: Reward Farming Burnaddress Accounting Exploit on MONA LisaVault”.
MONA LisaVault's redeem accepted a recipient argument and credited the recipient with the redeemed LP tokens, but the share debit was against msg.sender's balance rather than the recipient's. The attacker called redeem(victim) and walked victim's shares out.
DeFiHackLabs reconstructs the sequence against the live state; total loss is captured in the PoC.
What would have prevented it: a redeem whose share debit is keyed to the recipient, with any caller-supplied recipient rejected unless they have the legitimate share.
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Updated 14 Oct 2026. Figures are as reported by the sources listed above and are not independently verified.