JuiceboxREVLoans exploit analysis
JuiceboxREVLoans' `cashOut` weight was amplified by a same-block queue side-effect, letting the attacker queue in one call and redeem in the next. DeFiHackLabs reconstructs the on-chain drain.
- Reported loss
- 21.77 ETH, per DeFiHackLabs
- Occurred
- Logged
- Source
- DeFiHackLabs
Logged as “2026-04-20: Fake Terminal Loan Source Validation Bypass on JuiceboxREVLoans”.
Analysis1 min read
JuiceboxREVLoans' terminal pricing for a project's redemption credits used a cashOut weight that callers could pre-stage via a redemption queue side-effect. The attacker queued the side-effect in one call, settled the redemption in another, and walked the inflated credits out.
DeFiHackLabs reconstructs the sequence against the live state; total loss is captured in the PoC.
What would have prevented it: a cashOut weight computed against the same-block redemption state rather than a side-effect-amplified prior weight.
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Updated 14 Oct 2026. Figures are as reported by the sources listed above and are not independently verified.
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