SquidRouterModule, a Gnosis Safe module wrapping Axelar's `AxelarExpressExecutableWithToken`, accepted a crafted Squid message whose `validateProof` allowed arbitrary approve/transfer. DeFiHackLabs reconstructs the in-tx drain of 0.25 WBTC plus 0.29 wTAO plus 0.02 WETH.
Logged as “2026-05-25: Missing Caller Check on SquidRouterModule”.
SquidRouterModule is a Gnosis Safe module that lets a whitelisted Squid/Axelar bridge message run swap/approve actions on a Safe. It inherits Axelar's AxelarExpressExecutableWithToken, which validates an Axelar payload via validateProof. A misconfigured call allowed an attacker to construct a payload that the contract accepted as a whitelisted Squid message, allowing arbitrary approval/transfer on the Safe.
DeFiHackLabs reconstructs the sequence against the live Ethereum state; the drain is in 0x2d52984706d5ac567d554d40a62beeeda9e3901dd3847e93dd2a3117902abfeb on Etherscan for a total loss of 0.25 WBTC plus 0.29 wTAO plus 0.02 WETH.
What would have prevented it: a validateProof that strictly parses the caller payload and only allows the message shapes the Safe's role/admin policy can approve.
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Updated 14 Oct 2026. Figures are as reported by the sources listed above and are not independently verified.