SingularityDynaVault priced a deposit at the pre-rebase ratio and a withdrawal at the post-rebase ratio, allowing the attacker to walk the difference. DeFiHackLabs reconstructs the on-chain drain.
Logged as “2026-04-25: Oracle Misconfiguration Share Inflation on SingularityDynaVault”.
SingularityDynaVault's deposit credited shares at the live totalAssets() / totalSupply() ratio, and a withdrawal redeemed at the same ratio. A rebase() step that the contract did not guard against could push the ratio up between the caller's deposit and the caller's withdrawal in the same block, allowing the attacker to mint a small position and withdraw against an inflated ratio.
DeFiHackLabs reconstructs the sequence against the live state; the PoC reads the vulnerability from the on-chain behaviour.
What would have prevented it: a withdrawal that prices against a prior block's ratio rather than the live one.
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Updated 14 Oct 2026. Figures are as reported by the sources listed above and are not independently verified.