MureDistribution's `claim()` aggregated rewards against an inflated stake weight without debiting the recorded stake, so a single block claimed the whole accrued reward. DeFiHackLabs reconstructs about 5.45 ETH drained.
Logged as “2026-05-21: Signature Verification Bypass on MureDistribution”.
MureDistribution's claim() aggregated multiple rewards against an inflated stake weight and credited the user's claim balance without debiting the recorded balance. The attacker minted and staked just enough to inflate the stake weight in a single block, then claimed the aggregated reward.
DeFiHackLabs reconstructs the sequence against the live Ethereum state; the drain is in 0xb83040361a0ec72fa2d06ad69493226518a5f8b5d96c19b400626248f9c5b798 on Etherscan for a total loss of about 5.45 ETH. Defimon Alerts reported the incident.
What would have prevented it: a claim() debit on the user's recorded stake equal to the claim amount, with the aggregation reading from the same recorded stake rather than the live state.
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Updated 14 Oct 2026. Figures are as reported by the sources listed above and are not independently verified.