Crypto exploits

MureDistribution exploit analysis

MureDistribution's distribute() checked a claim's signature against a signer that an attacker-deployed pool contract could satisfy on itself, letting an empty signature pass as valid. DeFiHackLabs reconstructs a drain of about 5.45 ETH from a victim account's QUEST holdings, which DeFiLlama's hacks list prices at roughly $11,700.

David

Security ·

Reported loss
$12K
Occurred
Logged
Chain
Ethereum

Logged as “2026-05-21: Signature Verification Bypass on MureDistribution”.

Analysis3 min read

MureDistribution is the payout contract behind Mure's pools. It moves tokens out of a repository address to a depositor once a pool operator has signed off on the amount, through a distribute() call that takes a DistributionRecord (token, pool source, token repository, depositor, pool name, amount, deadline) and a signature, then transfers the token to the caller or to an address the caller names.

A pool could vouch for its own signature

Two checks gate that transfer. The distributable modifier requires only that the caller-supplied source address answers yes to ERC165Checker.supportsInterface(source, type(PoolMetadata).interfaceId), a self-reported capability flag rather than a registry lookup. _verifySignature then calls SignatureChecker.isValidSignatureNow against a signer address and checks that it approved the record's EIP-712 hash. The implementation verified on Etherscan resolves that signer from a dedicated storage slot, address signer, carrying the comment // added with patch inside the MureDistributionStorage struct, filled once through reinitialize() by an account holding DISTRIBUTION_ADMIN_ROLE. The comment marks the slot as a fix. DeFiHackLabs's proof of concept shows what it fixed: a contract the attacker named both as source and as the signer _verifySignature checked.

The proof of concept deploys a contract called MureSignerSource, which implements supportsInterface to return true for the PoolMetadata interface ID and implements isValidSignature to return the ERC-1271 magic value 0x1626ba7e for any hash and any signature, unconditionally. Naming that contract as both the record's source and the address checked for the signature let the attacker submit an empty bytes signature and have it accepted as valid.

The drain

  1. An externally owned account, 0x08096e9ae70D7C5F2707b203A7801b75d1412156, funded with 0.1 ETH from Tornado Cash, deploys an attack contract at 0x2B896760f8ad2ecf58ef93bdf71aC5e85C2B7F63.
  2. That contract deploys MureSignerSource at 0x26e5415c5bA86B4a521aAEBF538623B9f32cD467 and calls it.
  3. MureSignerSource calls distribute() on the MureDistribution proxy at 0x365083717eFB17F3895290BA38f20F568C7A4D8a, with a record naming QUEST (0x1Fc122FE8b6Fa6b8598799baF687539b5D3B2783) as the token, itself as source, the Safe-managed account 0x29b0a315924E05aC0c898a63D96daA33CfD1cAc7 as repository, an amount of 4,848,683.803036 QUEST, and an empty signature, naming itself as the recipient.
  4. distributable accepts source on the strength of its self-reported interface support. _verifySignature accepts the empty signature because the address it checks is MureSignerSource itself, which answers every signature check as valid.
  5. _transferAssets calls QUEST.transferFrom on the repository, pulling 4,848,683.803036 QUEST out of the Safe account's balance and into MureSignerSource, matching the token transfer Etherscan records for this transaction.
  6. MureSignerSource swaps the QUEST for 11,702.884506 USDC on Uniswap V3's QUEST-USDC pool, swaps that USDC for 5.451073450641245522 WETH on a separate USDC pool, unwraps it, and forwards the ETH through the attack contract to the attacker's account.

Etherscan's block timestamp puts the attack transaction at 04:04:47 UTC on 21 May 2026, the date the README entry also carries. DeFiHackLabs reports the loss as "~5.45 ETH." The exact transfer Etherscan records is 5.451073450641245522 ETH, valued by Etherscan at roughly $11,630 on the day of the transfer. DeFiLlama's hacks list carries the same incident, classified as a "Signature Verification Flaw," at $11,700, close to the 11,702.884506 USDC the attacker's contract held mid-swap. DeFiLlama dates the entry 23 May 2026, two days after the on-chain timestamp.

No post-mortem, a quiet patch

Mure has not published a post-mortem or any public statement about the incident. DeFiHackLabs's own entry lists the post-mortem as not available, and no bounty, pause notice or compensation announcement is public. The only visible response is in the contract itself: the verified implementation now reads its signer from the dedicated, admin-set storage slot described above, rather than from whatever resolved the signer at the time of the attack. Pinning signature verification to that fixed, trusted address from the start, instead of letting a caller-supplied pool contract stand in for it, would have closed the path the proof of concept used.

Sources read (7)

Other exploits

Query every incident yourself — free, no signup

Updated 9 Nov 2026. Figures are as reported by the sources listed above and are not independently verified.