SKP's token contract blocked every transfer out of its PancakeSwap pair except to whitelisted addresses, which only the owner could add, and on-chain data independently confirms the same wallet that set that whitelist also held the owner role, four and a half days before DeFiHackLabs' alleged insider drain. DeFiLlama's hacks database corroborates the date and a roughly $212,000 BNB Chain loss, though it classifies the incident as an accounting bug rather than a rug pull.
Security ·
Logged as “2026-05-26: Deliberately Engineered Drain Insider Exploit Rug Pull on SKP Token”.
SKP traded against USDT in a PancakeSwap V2 pair on BNB Smart Chain at 0x47C8c3b123De467892aC7dF6Dfcf7CA3dB901733. DeFiHackLabs' proof of concept and the README entry's own classification line both frame what followed as a premeditated insider drain rather than an external hack. The SKP token contract's verified source, read on Sourcify, confirms part of that framing and corrects part of it.
SKP's _transfer function blocks almost every transfer out of the pair outright. It requires from != usdtPair, reverting with "cannot buy or remove lp" for any sale unless the sender or the recipient appears in a feeWhiteList mapping that only the contract's owner can populate, through setFeeWhiteList, a function marked onlyOwner. That is a plainer mechanism than the PoC's own comments describe: there is no separate reserve-triggered treasury payout function anywhere in the deployed bytecode, which Sourcify matches to this source exactly. The whitelist exemption is the entire trap. With the pair unable to sell SKP to anyone else, only whitelisted addresses (the deployer, which the constructor whitelists, plus any address the owner adds, such as 0x646F7B...) can receive tokens leaving the pool, in whatever quantity the pool can cover.
The address the owner named was 0x646F7Bb10D81fF9734510d4e7583eB5247B28743. The call that set it was sent from 0x041F52BFE9f07503eFc5e7d4D176336E48095D56 to the SKP contract and mined in block 99,709,811 at 04:38:00 UTC on 22 May 2026, carrying the function selector 0xd83d4143, which is exactly the selector for setFeeWhiteList(address,bool). The SKP contract's owner() function returns that same address, 0x041F52BFE9f07503eFc5e7d4D176336E48095D56, independently tying the owner role to the whitelist-setter without relying on the PoC's say-so. The gap between that call and the drain is about four and a half days, not the roughly six days the PoC states.
The drain transaction itself was mined in block 100,582,079 at 17:47:44 UTC on 26 May 2026, sent from 0x83B9e7EDC5B3127E4853A4F4945b92aa88eEF0C8, the address the PoC names as the attacker. Its target was not PancakeSwap's router but a purpose-built contract at 0xE924853DcDfCb89292335042aB10D68C7315D7c1. The transaction's log data, which would show the exact USDT and SKP amounts moved, has not been independently read, so the PoC's own figures, roughly $205 million in aggregated flash-loan USDT and roughly 9.68 billion SKP paid to the whitelisted address, have not been independently re-derived from the logs. SKP's total supply, read on-chain today, is exactly 10,000,000,000 tokens, all minted to the deployer at construction, which leaves room for that much SKP to have reached the pair outside of normal liquidity accounting.
DeFiLlama's hacks database lists an entry for SKP dated 2026-05-26, on BNB Chain, with a reported loss of $212,000, matching the PoC's on-chain, after-fee profit figure to the nearest thousand. That is independent corroboration of the date, the chain and the broad size of the loss. It is not corroboration of the insider framing: DeFiLlama classifies the incident under "Token & Share Accounting" with the technique "Incorrect Share Accounting," a conventional vulnerability label, not a rug pull or insider designation. SlowMist's and CryptoTimes' coverage, which the PoC names, and the TenArmor alert on Bitget are not independently available.
The pair today holds a few thousandths of a USDT and a negligible SKP balance, a dead shell five months on, consistent with no liquidity, bounty or compensation having followed the drain. There is little to add on prevention beyond what the code itself shows: a token that can block every buyer but one by design is not carrying a bug for that one buyer to patch.
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Updated 9 Nov 2026. Figures are as reported by the sources listed above and are not independently verified.