Moonwell's `redeemUnderlying` priced against the live utilisation, so the attacker redeemed from a thin liquidation collateral address and walked the inflated redemption out. DeFiHackLabs reconstructs the on-chain drain.
Logged as “2026-02-15: Faulty Oracle on Moonwell”.
Moonwell's lending market had a redeemUnderlying path priced against the live utilisation. The attacker called redeemUnderlying from a thin liquidation collateral address, walked the inflated redemption out.
DeFiHackLabs reconstructs the sequence against the live Base state; total loss is captured in the PoC.
What would have prevented it: a redeemUnderlying path that prices against a multi-block utilisation, not the live state.
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Updated 14 Oct 2026. Figures are as reported by the sources listed above and are not independently verified.