Makina's accounting functions, accountForPosition() and updateTotalAum(), had no caller restriction, letting an attacker inflate a Curve-priced position and the share price it fed into DUSD. The DUSD/USDC pool lost a reported $5.1 million, though a front-running bot took the exploit from the attacker, most of the proceeds went to an MEV builder, which committed to returning 90 percent of it.
Security ·
Logged as “2026-01-20: Price Oracle Manipulation on Makina”.
Makina is an on-chain asset-management protocol: a Machine contract tracks total assets under management across strategies run by Caliber contracts, and that AUM sets the share price for its DUSD stablecoin. On 20 January 2026 an attacker combined two of Makina's own accounting functions with price moves in unrelated Curve pools to pull $5,107,871.18 out of Makina's DUSD/USDC Curve pool, a figure independent researcher anon-cBE4 gives from the attack transaction's fund flow in a public write-up. QuillAudits, in a separate analysis, describes the same event as a roughly $4 million theft and reports that more than $3.65 million had been recovered and distributed to affected users, with 89 percent of users fully recovering their assets and returned to users by 26 January 2026.
The root cause, per anon-cBE4's reading of Makina's own makina-core source on GitHub, was that Caliber.sol's accountForPosition() and Machine.sol's updateTotalAum() carried no caller restriction at all, no onlyOperator, no role check, nothing tying the call to a trusted address. accountForPosition() did require a Merkle-proven instruction, so the content of what it computed was constrained, but anyone could trigger when it ran. That mattered because one of the instructions the risk manager had pre-approved let the function price an existing MIM-3Crv position using Curve's calc_withdraw_one_coin, a read of a pool's own live exchange rate. updateTotalAum(), which looked like simple arithmetic, then folded that freshly recomputed position value into the Machine's total AUM and share price, with nothing checking whether the Curve pool it depended on had just been pushed somewhere unusual.
The attack borrowed $280,000,000 in USDC, $160,590,920 from Morpho Blue and the rest from Aave V3, and ran the following sequence twice:
accountForPosition() with the pre-approved instruction that reprices the MIM-3Crv position against the now-inflated poolupdateTotalAum(), carrying that inflated value into Makina's reported AUM and share priceThe two passes netted $3,451,824.15 and $1,657,149.19 before the flash loans were repaid.
What happened to that profit afterward is unusual. The transaction was front-run: a generalized mempool bot operating through contract 0x454d03b2a1D52F5F7AabA8E352225335a1b724E8 took the attacker's exploit, which the attacker had already deployed on-chain, by a route the write-up does not identify, and executed it first with a higher priority bribe, so it executed before the attacker's own transaction could. anon-cBE4 traces the real attacker to 0x2f934b0fd5c4f99bab37d47604a3a1aeadef1ccc, funded through Tornado Cash, and the address Etherscan actually labelled "Makinafi Exploiter," 0x935bfb495E33f74d2E9735DF1DA66acE442ede48, to the bot's operator rather than the attacker. Of the money taken from the pool, $4,151,959.74 went to an MEV builder address (0xa6c248384C5DDd934B83D0926D2E2A1dDF008387), the bot's address received only $415.76, and nothing reached the original attacker. The MEV builder that received the bulk of the funds committed to returning 90 percent of it under SEAL's Whitehat Safe Harbor process, which lines up with QuillAudits' recovery figures and puts Makina's net loss closer to $1,000,000 than to the $5.1 million pulled from the pool itself.
Makina's patch, commit 618b8f393, added an onlyAccountingAuthorized modifier to both accountForPosition() and updateTotalAum(), and introduced a check that reverts if the share price moves faster than a fixed percentage per second, closing both the open caller problem and the volatility it had let through.
The current post's description of the mechanism, a thin Curve pool read directly by a borrow function, does not match either source: the price Makina mis-stated was its own share price, derived through its own accounting functions, not a lending market reading a manipulated spot price.
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Updated 9 Nov 2026. Figures are as reported by the sources listed above and are not independently verified.