INKFinance's lending pool priced collateral against a manipulable oracle, so a flash-loan-driven price drop let the attacker borrow against the inflated collateral. DeFiHackLabs reconstructs about $140K drained on Polygon.
Logged as “2026-05-11: Business Logic Flaw on INKFinance”.
INKFinance's lending pool accepted an interest accrual rate that was set against a manipulated price oracle. The attacker flash-loaned the price oracle's underlying token, dropped the price, then borrowed against the inflated collateral position.
DeFiHackLabs reconstructs the sequence against the live Polygon state; the drain is in 0xb469a24ec737be16fe41367a7b5b315c7f03b4e0ff3af50b3a2db03b3066b982 on Polygonscan for a total loss of about $140K.
What would have prevented it: a price oracle with a TWAP guard, or any lending position that is bounded by a per-block borrow cap that is not affected by oracle volatility.
Query every incident yourself — free, no signup
Updated 14 Oct 2026. Figures are as reported by the sources listed above and are not independently verified.