HumaFinance's credit-token redeem priced its payoff against an oracle that the attacker had flash-moved, so the redemption captured the inflated payoff. DeFiHackLabs reconstructs the in-pool USDT balance drained.
Logged as “2026-05-11: Credit Approval Bypass on HumaFinance”.
HumaFinance's redeem of a credit-bearing token accepted an oracle-priced payoff that the attacker had previously moved via a flash loan. The attacker redeemed at the inflated payoff, leaving the pool with the credit balance and the attacker with the redeemed value.
DeFiHackLabs reconstructs the sequence against the live Ethereum state; total loss was recorded as approximately the credit pool's full USDT balance.
What would have prevented it: a redemption priced against a multi-block oracle, or any redemption that caps per-block payouts.
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Updated 14 Oct 2026. Figures are as reported by the sources listed above and are not independently verified.