An attacker spent nine months building a position in Venus Protocol's Core Pool THE market, then donated tokens straight to the vTHE contract to inflate its exchange rate past the supply cap and borrowed CAKE, BNB, USDC and BTCB against it. DeFiLlama and Rekt.news put the net extracted assets at $3.7 million, against $2.15 million left as bad debt after liquidation.
Security ·
Logged as “2026-03-15: Borrowbehalf Donation Attack on Venus THE”.
Venus is a Compound V2 fork lending protocol on BNB Chain. Venus's Core Pool on BNB Chain lists THE, the governance token of the DEX Thena, as both collateral and a borrowable asset against a supply cap of 14.5 million tokens. On March 15, 2026, an attacker who had spent nine months building a position inside that cap used a direct token transfer to push past it, then borrowed against the inflated collateral it created.
The entry point for new collateral is VToken.mint(), which calls Comptroller.preMintHook. That hook reads supplyCaps[vToken] and reverts with SupplyCapExceeded if minting would push the market's total supply, valued at the current exchangeRateStored(), past the cap. The cap exists only in that one code path. A plain ERC-20 transfer of THE straight to the vTHE contract never calls mint(), so preMintHook never runs, yet the vToken's exchange rate is still computed from the cash the contract holds. According to Rekt.news, six wallets pushed roughly 36 million THE into vTHE in the attack's opening transaction, which is close to the 36,096,716 THE the proof-of-concept's own donation total implies. The same position, unchanged in vToken count, went from backing about $3.3 million in collateral to over $12 million, an exchange rate inflated 3.81 times by tokens the cap was never designed to see.
That collateral backed borrowBehalf, a function Venus restricts to addresses the borrower has approved through Comptroller.updateDelegate. The address holding the inflated THE position, 0x1A35bD28EFD46CfC46c2136f878777D69ae16231, had delegated that borrowing power to a contract at 0x737bc98F1D34E19539C074B8Ad1169d5d45dA619, which drew CAKE, BNB, USDC and BTCB without ever holding collateral itself. DeFiHackLabs's proof-of-concept, at the transaction 0x4f477e941c12bbf32a58dc12db7bb0cb4d31d41ff25b2457e6af3c15d7f5663f, labels 0x1A35… the "victim," but Rekt.news's account of Venus's own post-mortem names it as the attacker's collateral-holding address, with a second address, 0x43C743e316F40d4511762EEdf6f6D484F67b2F82, identified by Quill Audits as a second attacker wallet rather than anyone the attack was done to.
The loop then repeated: borrow against the inflated collateral, buy more THE on thin decentralized-exchange liquidity, donate the new THE into vTHE to push the cap again, wait for the oracle to catch up, and borrow again. Venus's Resilient Oracle cross-checks RedStone and Binance feeds through a BoundValidator that, per Rekt.news, rejected the spiking Binance price for about 37 minutes before both feeds converged near $0.51, itself close to double the pre-attack level and enough to support another round of borrowing. THE's spot price ran from roughly $0.26 to near $4 on the thinnest venue before the loop stopped. At its peak the position held 53.2 million THE, 367 percent of the cap, against 6.67 million CAKE, 2,801 BNB, 1.58 million USDC and 20 BTCB borrowed, a nominal $14.9 million total. A second, smaller position opened by the attack contract at 11:55 UTC began liquidating at 12:04, ahead of the main one. When the primary position's health factor reached the liquidation threshold, 53.2 million THE hit an order book with almost no depth and the price collapsed to about $0.22.
DeFiLlama's hacks database and Rekt.news both put the net extracted assets at $3.7 million, the figure Venus and most coverage use, though Rekt.news separately reports roughly $5.07 million in gross assets pulled out before liquidation reversed part of the position. Venus was left with $2.15 million in bad debt, 1.18 million CAKE and 1.84 million THE that liquidation proceeds could not cover. Funding for the nine-month build-up traced to 7,447 ETH moved through Tornado Cash and $9.92 million borrowed against it on Aave. As of Rekt.news's reporting, the extracted funds sat unmoved in the attacker's wallet, with no bridge or mixer activity, leaving open the possibility the real payoff was a short position on THE elsewhere rather than the on-chain haul itself.
Venus's response, by Rekt.news's account, moved in stages over about five hours: a first statement naming only the THE and CAKE markets as affected, a pause on THE borrows and withdrawals an hour later, then collateral factors cut to zero on six other markets plus lisUSD wherever a single wallet held over 60 percent of supplied collateral. A post-mortem from Venus's risk manager, Allez Labs, followed on March 17, confirming the donation path had been flagged in a 2023 Code4rena audit contest and dismissed then as "supported behavior with no negative side effects." The same mechanism had already cost Venus $716,789 net in February 2025 on its zkSync deployment, through a direct donation to a wUSDM vault rather than a vTHE market. Venus committed to tighter collateral factors on illiquid assets, a full re-audit of the core pool, a governance vote on covering the bad debt, and coordination with forensic partners on the Tornado Cash funding trail.
The same donate-to-inflate pattern, applied to a reward accounting balance rather than a lending exchange rate, drained X7Finance: a flash-loaned ETH donation inflated a per-token reward variable instead of a vToken's exchange rate, but both bugs trusted a contract's raw balance as proof of a legitimate deposit.
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Updated 8 Nov 2026. Figures are as reported by the sources listed above and are not independently verified.