Crypto exploits

SummerFi exploit analysis

An attacker inflated the net asset value of SummerFi's FleetA by donating cheaply minted vgUSDC, backed by a depegged xUSD position, into an empty Silo-managed Ark, then redeemed shares against the fleet's other liquidity. The attack transaction shows a realized 6,016,755 DAI, in line with DeFiHackLabs' reported loss of roughly $6M in DAI and LVUSDC shares.

David

Security ·

Reported loss
$6.0M
Occurred
Logged
Chain
Ethereum

Logged as “2026-07-06: Fleetcommander Nav Inflation Via Depegged Xusd on SummerFi”.

Analysis3 min read

Lazy Summer Protocol, built by the team behind Summer.fi, routes deposits through a FleetCommander contract, 0x98c49e13bf99D7CAd8069faa2A370933EC9EcF17, verified on Etherscan, that calculates its net asset value as the sum of totalAssets() across a set of "Arks," each one a wrapper around a separate yield strategy. On 6 July 2026 an attacker used that aggregation to drain one of those fleets, FleetA, of DAI and USDC on Ethereum mainnet by inflating the value one Ark reported, then redeeming against the pool.

The weak Ark, SiloManagedVaultArk at 0x61d7063041d83C8ca3E42c39181dFd14B3Bc76c2, wraps a Silo-managed vault position the proof of concept calls vgUSDC. Its source is also verified, and its totalAssets() reads a balance straight from that Silo vault's own share-redemption value rather than pricing the vault's underlying components independently. One of those components was Stream USD (xUSD), a token that had already depegged from par. Because the Ark trusted the Silo vault's internal accounting instead of checking whether the backing it counted was still worth par, an attacker who could acquire the vgUSDC position cheaply could make the Ark, and with it the whole FleetCommander's share price, read far higher than the Ark's real holdings.

The Ark held nothing when the attack ran (the proof of concept forks mainnet at block 25,471,347, one block before the attack transaction), so there was no existing balance in it to dilute a donation. The attacker's wallet, 0x7BF716167B48CF527725722C6d79494b45B3BDCa, ran the attack through a contract at 0x0514F827C129C16418a0933E03C99A6AF982FC61:

  1. A Morpho flash loan borrowed 1,000,000 USDT, and inside its callback a second, nested Morpho flash loan of roughly 65.4 million USDC supplied the working capital for everything that followed.
  2. A flash-funded deposit into each of several Morpho-backed VaultV2 arks sitting behind FleetA, followed by a forceDeallocate call against each one, pulled close to 4.4 million USDC of standing collateral free, so the fleet's reported withdrawable assets could cover the redemption still to come.
  3. 20,000 of the borrowed USDT was swapped into xUSD on a Uniswap V4 pool, then the xUSD was swapped into vgUSDC through a Balancer V3 pool. Because xUSD was trading below par, this minted vgUSDC at a cost far under the value the Ark would later credit it at.
  4. Roughly 64.8 million USDC of the flash-borrowed capital went into FleetA through an ordinary deposit() call, taken at the fleet's honest, pre-attack exchange rate, which gave the attacker a large share position before the price moved.
  5. The attacker transferred the cheaply minted vgUSDC directly into the empty SiloManagedVaultArk, bypassing its deposit accounting entirely. That raised the Ark's reported totalAssets(), and with it FleetCommander's per-share value.
  6. FleetCommander.redeem() cashed the attacker's shares out at the new, inflated rate, paying from the liquidity the earlier forceDeallocate calls had freed rather than from the donated vgUSDC itself.
  7. The attacker repaid both flash loans, topping the USDT leg back up through a Curve 3pool trade, converted the leftover USDC profit to DAI on the same pool, and sent it on.

The attack transaction shows that wallet receiving 6,016,755 DAI, in line with the proof of concept's own total of 6.02 million DAI and with DeFiHackLabs' README entry, which puts the reported loss at "~$6M (DAI + LVUSDC shares)." That figure is split: the proof of concept's own comments attribute about 5.6 million of the total to the FleetA leg it reproduces, with the remaining roughly 0.4 million coming from a second FleetCommander, referred to in the same comments as FleetB, through its LVUSDC shares. That second leg is not reproduced in the proof of concept, and no source beyond the README's own figure accounts for it in further detail.

No independent write-up of this incident, from Summer.fi, a security firm, or news coverage, could be found. Summer.fi's current blog page states that the Summer.fi app has been deactivated and the Lazy Summer Protocol is now in withdraw-only mode, but nothing on that page ties the shutdown to this exploit, so no connection is drawn here.

What would have prevented it is specific to this one Ark: SiloManagedVaultArk's totalAssets() needed a check on what was actually backing the Silo vault's reported value, not just the vault's own stated share price, before counting any of it at par. A related gap shows up in a SetProtocol RebalancingSetTokenV3 vault, where the permissionless actualizeFee() recomputed unitShares with a divCeil that rounded the backing collateral per share up even though no fee was minted, so issuing before the bump and redeeming after it returned more collateral than was deposited. The two bugs differ in kind, a rounding error exploited with a flash-loaned issue/redeem there, a mispriced depegged holding donated into an empty Ark here, but in both an attacker moved a vault's own accounting of its backing before cashing out shares at the new number.

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Updated 9 Nov 2026. Figures are as reported by the sources listed above and are not independently verified.