Aztec Connect exploit proof of concept

Aztec Connect's RollupProcessorV3 had a numRealTxs mismatch between proof/hash coverage and L1 settlement. decodeProof() committed public inputs in full inner-rollup chunks, but processDepositsAndWithdrawals() settled exactly numRealTxs transactions, so the proof claimed more txs than the L1 contract was prepared to back. The attacker funded via Tornado Cash, submitted a forged rollup proof, and walked the rollup's pooled assets out through the escape-style path.

The attacker EOA 0x0F18D8b44a740272f0be4d08338d2b165b7EdD17 sent a single transaction through orchestrator 0x06f585F74e0DA633Ae813A0f23Fb9900B61d0fcD against the RollupProcessorV3 contract 0xFF1F2B4ADb9dF6FC8eAFecDcbF96A2B351680455. The drain is in 0x074ec9317d8336db37e8c348fbdd7515573ff4088239c77ab429f522509aeeb1 on Etherscan at block 25,315,715.

DeFiHackLabs reports a total loss of about $2.19M (908.99 ETH plus 270.5K DAI plus 167.9 wstETH plus yvDAI, yvWETH, LUSD, and yvLUSD balances). The PoC reproduces the ETH leg. The cryptotimes.io post-mortem and the Foundation's post agree on the order of magnitude.

This incident and the Aztec V1 incident overlap: both came off the same underlying cryptographic break; this one touched the deprecated RollupProcessorV3 contract, the V1 one touched the original V1 rollup.