AROS's router-skim path paid the caller the pair's WBNB surplus at an inflated AROS reserve. DeFiHackLabs reconstructs about $295K drained on BNB Chain.
Logged as “2026-05-30: Signature Replay on AROS”.
AROS's token contract carried a skim window on the AROS/WBNB pair that, when called by a router, paid the caller the pair's WBNB surplus. The attacker flash-loaned WBNB, performed a series of swaps that inflated the AROS reserve to a point where the router-skim path returned the pair's WBNB balance.
DeFiHackLabs reconstructs the sequence against the live BNB Chain state; the drain is in 0xe89fe640ec5241edfca7d8dcae77a0a4270dee15e4bbd043fc60e393aabf41e1 on BscScan for a total loss of about $295K. TenArmorAlert reported the incident.
What would have prevented it: removing the public skim path from the AROS pair, or restricting the skim reward to the deployer.
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Updated 14 Oct 2026. Figures are as reported by the sources listed above and are not independently verified.